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EMINENT DOMAIN: A CASE COMMENT-MOUNTAIN
STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION V. HODEL
I. INTRODUCTION
The founding fathers of the United States, in their creation of the
Constitution, went to great lengths to protect private property from
governmental use and invasion. While government has the right to ex-
propriate private property for purposes beneficial to the general public,
it cannot require a single property owner to bear the costs of providing
property for the general public.' This principle, which is the essence of
the property clause of the fifth amendment, 2 commands that the cost of
public benefits must be borne by the public. 3 The fifth amendment de-
mands just compensation to property owners as a governmental
restraint.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Mountain States Legal Founda-
tion v. Hodel,4 has lifted the restraints on governmental power by al-
lowing the use of the Rock Springs Grazing Association's (the
"Association") land by wild horses without just compensation. The hor-
ses are exclusively and affirmatively under the control of the Secretary of
the Interior under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (the
"Act"). 5 The Act was promulgated to protect wild horses from "cap-
ture, branding, harassment, or death." 6 It places them under the sole
dominion of the Secretary of the Interior and prevents any management
or control of such horses by private parties. 7 Due to the Secretary's
noncompliance with the Act, the unmanaged horses caused thousands
of dollars of damage8 to the Association's property.
This article addresses the different types of takings, the tests used to
determine whether a property owner is entitled to compensation, and
the case law through which these tests developed. It will also demon-
strate how the tests were confused and misapplied by the Tenth Circilit
Court of Appeals to the facts in Hodel.
II. BACKGROUND
The determination of whether a governmental action constitutes a
taking is not a clear-cut task. Although there is no analytical formula in
1. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
2. Clause four of the fifth amendment provides that "private property (shall not) be
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V, § 2.
3. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980).
4. 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986), vacated sub nomn. Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Clark, 740 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1616 (1987).
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1982).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(3) (1982).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
8. Brief for appellant at 19, Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 779 F.2d 1423
(10th Cir. 1986), indicates the amount of damage.
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which to insert the facts and render a solution, guidelines have evolved
through case law which facilitate a takings analysis. 9
The landmark case in takings jurisprudence is Mugler v. Kansas,10
where the Supreme Court in 1887 upheld the shutdown of a brewery
under the Kansas prohibition law. The United States Supreme Court
closely examined the character of the action and recognized the need for
categorization of governmental action.I The Court distinguished two
types of governmental takings which necessitate compensation: (1) a
regulatory taking, which is a restriction on land use outside the authority
of the police power, and (2) an actual physical invasion. 12 When gov-
ernment causes the latter, the landowner may recover through an in-
verse condemnation action. "Inverse condemnation" is the term used
to "[describe] the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensa-
tion for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have
not been instituted."' 13 Such action is brought by the landowner when
government causes a physical invasion to private property.
Thirty-five years after Mugler, in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the
Supreme Court developed a balancing approach to the takings analy-
sis. 14 In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes placed the government's au-
thority to regulate on a continuum by stating that if a regulation goes
too far, it will be recognized as a taking. 15 Like Mugler, Pennsylvania Coal
represents the theory that a regulatory taking may be present without a
physical occupation, but it is most noted for the balancing test it estab-
lished, weighing the private burden against the public benefit.
16
Though not often cited in recent cases, Mugler still influences case
law today. The following demonstrates the necessity of characterizing
the nature of the government interference as either a regulation or a
physical occupation. The standards applied in determining whether a
property owner deserves compensation depend on which category the
government action belongs. Whether governmental action is a regula-
tion properly exercised under the police power, or a permanent physical
occupation warranting inverse condemnation is the issue upon which
Hodel turns.
A. Inverse Condemnation Based on "Permanent Physical Occupation"
In a takings analysis, the court often analogizes property rights to a
"bundle of sticks," with each stick representing a property right.
17
Some sticks in that bundle are more valuable than others, the right to
9. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). See infra
notes 11-71 and accompanying text.
10. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
I 1. See Note, "Taking" Jurisprudence and its Application to Regulations of Sensitive Ecological
Environments, Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 489, 493 (1981).
12. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. at 666-69.
13. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
14. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
15. Id. at 415.
16. Id. at 413-15.
17. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982);
[Vol. 65:4
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exclude being the most valuable. The Supreme Court applies a per se
rule when the government physically and permanently occupies one's
land. The per se rule renders a physical invasion to be a taking regard-
less of an offsetting public interest and differs from the ad hoc test ap-
plied to regulatory takings which balances several competing factors.' 8
The regular use of private property by the government is "[t]he one
incontestable case for compensation."' 9 Indeed, both federal and state
governments have been required to compensate property owners for the
use of their property in numerous cases. 20 A discussion of the inverse
condemnation case law will facilitate the understanding of when com-
pensation is required for government action.
The United States Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CA TV Corp. 21 applied the per se rule and found for the landowner in
an inverse condemnation proceeding. In Loretto, the Court determined
that a New York statute, forcing a landlord to permit installation of cable
facilities on private property, constituted a taking. 22 The Loretto Court
held that the permanent physical occupation by the cables is a taking
regardless of offsetting public interests which include the educational
and recreational benefits provided by cable television. Justice Marshall
stated that "[o]ur cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of
the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an impor-
tant public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
owner."
2 3
Airplane flights in U.S. v. Causby2 4 infringed on a farmer's property
rights to the extent that the Supreme Court found a taking in an inverse
condemnation proceeding. The land over which the airplanes flew was
held to have been "appropriated as directly and completely as if it [was]
used for the runways themselves."' 25  The Court compared Causby's
facts to Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. ,26 where a property owner was
denied compensation for the nuisance of smoke, noise, and vibrations
from a nearby railroad. 2 7 In Richards, the elimination from the property
owner's "bundle of sticks," that stick which represented the right to en-
joy property free from nuisance, was not a substantial enough loss to
constitute a taking. However, in Causby, the stick the government took
from the "bundle of property rights" was the right to exclude; thus, the
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176 (1979).
18. Tarlock, Regulatory Takings, 60 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 23, 26 (1984).
19. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of 'Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967).
20. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987); Loretto, 458 U.S.
419; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
21. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
22. Id. at 426.
23. Id. at 434-35.
24. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
25. Id. at 262.
26. 233 U.S. 546 (1910).
27. Causby, 328 U.S. at 262.
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govenment effectuated a taking. 28 The degree of actual governmental
appropriation of the land in Causby and Richards was crucial in the
Court's determination of whether land had actually been physically in-
vaded, necessitating compensation.
The Court again emphasized the right to exclude as being highly
protected in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.2 9 In order to create a marina, a
pond owner dug an inlet through a natural barrier. The owner was
faced with a government claim that the marina had become part of the
navigational waterways, and therefore must be open to the public. The
Supreme Court held that the government servitude constituted a taking
of the landowner's right to exclude which is "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as prop-
erty. ' 3" The Kaiser Court, in order to avoid compensation from the in-
verse condemnation, however, found the marina did not constitute a
navigational waterway.
The Supreme Court reconfirmed the importance of a property
owner's right to exclude in Leo Sheep Co. v. United States.3 1 There, the
government's easement over private property to a public recreational
area necessitated compensation in an inverse condemnation proceeding.
The government argued that the public use of the road was an easement
by necessity and therefore no compensation should be paid. However,
because the government has the power of eminent domain, the Court
found that the easement of necessity doctrine is not available to the
sovereign.
3 2
The United States government has been required to compensate
private property owners for physical occupation of property. This has
included compensation for use of water rights,33 underlying secured
materials,3 4 and the use of a leasehold.
3 5
B. Regulatory Takings
Although at one time eminent domain and police power were two
different concepts, they have merged to mean practically the same thing:
the government's authority to regulate land use is for the common well-
being of the public. 3 6 In short, the police power is the government's
authority to regulate private property for public use. 3 7 When a regula-
28. Id. at 262.
29. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
30. Id. at 176.
31. 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
32. Id. at 680.
33. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
34. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
35. United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
36. See Comment, Eminent Domain, the Police Power and the Fifth Amendment: Defining the
Domain of the Takings Analysis, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 491, 499 (1986).
37. Id. at 499. "Public use" means the furtherance of the public interest in health,
safety, welfare or morals. The decision of what constitutes public use is left to the legisla-
ture. Most courts, although empowered to decide questions of public use, choose not to
second-guess the legislature.
[Vol. 65:4
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tion is outside the boundaries of authority granted by police power, it is
a "regulatory taking" which requires compensation.
The government's authority to regulate under the police power was
very broad in 1915 when the Supreme Court rendered the opinion of
Hadacheck v. Sebastian.38 Hadacheck represents the theory that, although a
regulation diminishes the value of property, compensation is not due
where diminution is the result of the police power.3 9 In Hadacheck, the
City of Los Angeles passed an ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of
bricks within city limits. Although the regulation diminished the value
of Hadacheck's land from $800,000 to $60,000, diminution of value
alone was not enough to constitute a taking. Because the restriction
served a substantial public purpose, it was upheld against the takings
challenge. The scope of judicial review was thus extremely limited so
long as the legislative act supported a public purpose.
40
In 1922, Justice Holmes did find a regulatory taking in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon4 ' when the Pennsylvania legislature went beyond its
constitutional powers by enacting a statute which prohibited the mining
of coal in a manner that would cause surface subsidence. Using a bal-
ancing test, Justice Holmes weighed the public benefit against the pri-
vate burden and found the regulation to be an infringement of such
magnitude on mine owner's property rights that it could not be al-
lowed. 4 2 Justice Holmes sustained the coal company's argument that
enforcement of the Pennsylvania statute constituted a taking under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.
43
After Pennsylvania Coal, the Court for many years found that regula-
tions did not constitute takings because they fell under the pervasive-
ness of the police power;44 however, there were a few exceptions. In
Nectrow v. City of Cambridge,45 property suitable for commercial purposes
was rezoned to residential. Justice Sutherland found the rezoning to be
a taking because the area in question adjoined land used for commercial
purposes and the property would have been of little value if limited to
residential use.
4 6
Until recent years, the Court sustained land use regulations despite
claims that the government had taken private property. Courts do not
often scrutinize the legislature's decision to regulate property for the
common good of the public. Although courts have not commented di-
rectly on the issue, because of the nature of land use regulation, they
have used a more deferential standard than that used with a physical
invasion of land. 4 7 The Supreme Court has been consistently reluctant
38. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
39. See Comment, supra note 19.
40. Id.
41. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
42. Id. at 413.
43. Id. at 413-15.
44. See notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
45. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
46. Id. at 187. See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
47. See Comment, supra note 19.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to require compensation for the loss of property caused by government
regulation.
48
In 1978, the Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,4 9 one of the most frequently cited takings cases, articulated a test
composed of three factors to be considered in compensation or takings
analysis: (1) the character of the governmental action, 50 (2) the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation, 5 1 and (3) the extent government action
interferes with investment-backed expectations. 52 These factors have
been interpreted to mean that unless property is one hundred percent
diminished by a regulation, there is no taking.
53
The Supreme Court's analysis of Agins v. City of Tiburon54 demon-
strates a combined approach of the Penn Central three factor test and the
Pennsylvania Coal balancing test. Claimants challenged a zoning ordi-
nance which limited the development of their property to one-family
dwellings, accessory buildings, and open space uses. The court held
that the issue of whether to compensate the landowners required a
weighing of private and public interests. 5 5 In Agins, the public interest
in preserving open space outweighed the private interest. In support of
the holdings that there can be no taking without just compensation, the
Court used the Penn Central test. 56 Because there was no complete de-
nial of the owner's economically viable use of land, the zoning ordinance
did not effectuate a taking.
The Agins Court's analysis also set forth an additional test to be
used in evaluating a regulatory taking, that which has come to be called
the "ends-means" test.5 7 A regulation on property is upheld under the
state's police power if that regulation promotes a legitimate public pur-
pose and is likely to advance that purpose. 5 8 "The public interest,"
courts have found, includes the protection of endangered species and
wildlife. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1916,59 for example, was up-
held against the challenges of landowners who claimed its promulgation
amounted to a taking in Bishop v. United States.60 Property owners sued
the government for the alleged taking of hunting facilities and for crop
damage resulting from a prohibition to hunt wild geese. The Court held
48. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
49. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
50. Id. at 130.
51. Id. at 128.
52. Id. at 136.
53. See Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926)(75% diminution of property value, resulting from
enactment of a zoning ordinance, was not sufficient to constitute a taking); Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915) (87% diminution of property's value, resulting from prohibition of brick
manufacturing within city limits, did not constitute a taking).
54. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
55. Id. at 260.
56. Id. at 262-63.
57. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
58. Id. at 261.
59. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1982).
60. 126 F. Supp. 449 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 955 (1955).
(Vol. 65:4
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the important goal of protection and preservation of game justified the
restriction and found that there was no taking under the fifth amend-
ment.6 1 In Sickman v. United States,62 a claim similar to that in Bishop was
brought by property owners. There, the Court held that the govern-
ment did not own the wild geese, and therefore they were not responsi-
ble for their trespass and the resulting damage.
63
Andrus v. Allard64 demonstrated that there is unlikely to be a taking
of property when an alternative use for property exists. The court also
reinforced the substantial public interest in protecting wildlife through
regulation. Merchants who sold artifacts containing eagle feathers
brought a claim for damages resulting from the enforcement of the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act 6 5 which prohibited destroying or re-
moving their nests and selling or collecting their feathers. The Court
held that because the regulation did not compel the surrender of the
feathers and there was no physical invasion or restraint on the
merchants, there was not a taking. 66 Although the Court banned the
most profitable use of the feathers,6 7 their value had not been suffi-
ciently reduced since the merchants were allowed to keep therfi. 6 8
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion of case law, regula-
tory takings analysis requires the Pennsylvania Coal balancing approach of
weighing the public interest versus the private interest. In evaluating
the private interest, courts use the Penn Central test to consider the eco-
nomic hardship on the property owner.69 The Court has refused to find
a taking even in the face of substantial diminution of property.
70
The inverse condemnation analysis, however, does not require the
same balancing and economic hardship test. The rule to be followed, in
a situation where there is a permanent physical occupation resulting
from government action, is just compensation to the property owner.
7 1
C. The Wild and Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act
Congress passed The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
72
in order to protect the dwindling population from hunting and commer-
61. 126 F. Supp. at 452-53.
62. 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1951).
63. 184 F.2d at 618.
64. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1982).
66. 444 U.S. at 64.
67. Id.
68. "[Wihere an owner possesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the destruction
of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety." Id.
69. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261-62; Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66.
70. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). In Goldblatt, the owner
of a gravel pit was not compensated for a taking when regulation banned excavation from
the potentially dangerous pit. No regulatory taking was found because the owner failed to
present evidence that the value of the lot on which the pit was located was completely
diminished. The court held that diminution of value alone did not establish a taking.
71. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
72. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982).
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cial exploitation by prohibiting "malicious harassment."7 3 This Act
placed all wild horses under the sole dominion of the Secretary of the
Interior, preventing any management or control of such horses by pri-
vate parties. 74 Kleppe v. New Mexico75 upheld the Act as a proper exer-
cise of congressional power, thereby confirming the duty and authority
of the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") to manage the horses and
burros as part of the public land system.
Under the Act, the Secretary of Interior has exclusive control to
manage wild horses and is required to remove horses from private prop-
erty upon the owners request. 76 This affirmative duty to manage means
the Secretary must locate and relocate the horses from time to time "in a
manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural eco-
logical balance on the public lands."' 77 Only the Secretary of Interior
may capture, move, or otherwise manage the horses; any other person
found to perform these acts could be criminally prosecuted.
7 8
III. FACTS
The Mountain States Legal Foundation 79 filed this action because
wild horses were destroying the Association's land. They argued that
because the Secretary of the Interior failed to perform his duty of re-
moving the horses upon their request, as mandated under section 4 of
the Wild Horses Act, the government was liable for resulting damage to
their property. 80 The nature of the government's action, they con-
tended, was best characterized as inaction, having resulted in the physi-
cal occupation of wild horses on private property.
The Wyoming land in question covers an area about 115 miles long
by forty miles wide and is called the "checkerboard." This title was
given to land granted by the federal government to the Union Pacific
railroad in the Union Pacific Act of 1862.81 Odd-numbered sections of
640 acres each, running along the original railbed, were granted to the
73. 43 C.F.R. § 4700.0-5(k) (1985). Malicious harassment was defined by the Depart-
ment of the Interior as:
an intentional act which demonstrates a deliberate disregard for the well-being of
wild and free roaming horses and burros and which creates the likelihood of in-
quiry, or is detrimental to normal behavior patterns.... Such acts include but are
not limited to, authorizing chasing, pursuing, herding, roping, or attempting to
gather or catch wild, free-roaming horses and burros.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1982).
75. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1982).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(3) (1982).
79. Mountain States Legal Foundation is a non-profit public interest law foundation,
dedicated to the preservation of individual liberties and private property rights. Many of
the Foundation's members are shareholders in the Rock Springs Grazing Association.
The Foundation initiated the lawsuit to protect its members' property interests and consti-
tutional rights.
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982) ("If wild, free-roaming horses or burros stray from public
lands onto privately owned land, the owners of such land may inform the nearest federal
marshall or agent of the Secretary, who shall arrange to have the animals removed ... ").
81. For history and discussion of railroad land grants, see J. Laitos, Natural Resources
Law 251-253 (1985).
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Union Pacific, while even numbered lots were retained by the federal
government, thus creating a "checkerboard" pattern. Union Pacific has
since sold portions of their property to private landowners who mainly
use it for grazing. The Association purchased their land from Union
Pacific in 1909 and has since used it for winter cattle and sheep grazing.
The BLM has issued grazing permits to allow the Association to graze
their livestock on federal land. 82 The wild horse herds have continually
grazed the Association's unfenced private property, as well as adjoining
public lands.
In 1972, there were an estimated 1,116 wild horses on the checker-
board. At the time the Association filed their lawsuit in 1979, the popu-
lation had more than doubled. As a result of the drastic herd population
increase, vast quantities of the Association's forage were consumed.
Due to the nature of the sensitive soil and growing conditions, it will be
many years before the depleted land will be replenished to its former
grazing capacity.
83
The Association's property is comprised of high desert badlands
and sand dunes. Horse trails are frequently found in steep terrain
where the soil is particularly sensitive to overuse and erosion, resulting
in damage to the forage.
84
In order to stem the loss of forage and water, the Association,
within six months of the passage of the Act, made repeated oral and
written requests, pursuant to section 4 of the Act, to the BLM to remove
the horses from their property. 85 Despite the requests and offers of aid
from the Association, the horses were not removed, and in fact, the
numbers greatly increased.
86
The Association's cause of action for compensation was the result
of the BLM's noncompliance with the mandates of the Act which require
that the Secretary shall remove the wild horses upon request within a
reasonable time. 8 7 The Association sought a declaratory judgment that
the Secretary mismanaged the horses. 8 8 They also filed a writ of manda-
mus to compel the Director of the BLM to reduce the herd population
on the adjacent public land. Damages of $500,000 were requested by
the Association from the Director of the BLM for the alleged uncompen-
82. Brief for appellant at 6, Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 779 F.2d 1423
(10th Cir. 1986).
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id. at 5-7.
85. Id. at 7 n. i. The ineffectiveness of the program is revealed by the total number of
horses rounded up yearly. The wild horse population increases 15% to 25% each year.
The BLM was not even able to remove the annual increase, much less reduce the overall
population.
86. See Opening Brief for appellant at 26, Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 779
F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986)(Frank Gregg, director of the BLM, and under pressure from
various media sources, was alleged to have diverted funds, originally appropriated for wild
horse removal and adoption, to an investigation of the treatment of already adopted hor-
ses. As a result, the BLM cancelled the wild horse gathering activities for 1979).
87. See supra note 77.
88. 799 F.2d at 1424.
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
sated taking of its property. 8 9
The District Court granted the Association's petition for mandamus
to remove the horses, dismissed the claim against the Director, and
granted the summary judgment. In the Tenth Circuit Court's first hear-
ing, it affirmed the dismissal of the claim against the director but re-
versed and remanded the grant of summary judgment, holding that an
unresolved factual issue precluded a summary determination of the tak-
ings claim. The government respondents sought a rehearing en banc in
September of 1984. In March of 1985, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals granted rehearing of the case as to whether the trial court properly
dismissed the Association's claim and whether the Secretary's failure to
manage the horses constituted a taking.90
A. Majority Holding
Judge McKay, writing for the four member majority of the court,
affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for the
government. The court held that the Association was not entitled to
compensation because the government action was nothing more than a
land use regulation enacted by Congress to ensure the survival of a par-
ticular species of wildlife.9 1 The court cited a series of cases 92 to show
that damage to private property by protecting wildlife did not constitute
a taking. Through a discussion of Andrus v. Allard,9 3 Sickman v. United
States9 4 and Barrett v. State,95 the court demonstrated the Supreme
Court's stance on the paramount interest of wildlife protection by regu-
lation. Through these case analyses, the majority likened the Wild Hor-
ses Act to the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. The degree of govern-
mental control in these acts, the Tenth Circuit stated, was no different in
character from the Wild Horses Act.
96
A second line of reasoning in support of the constitutionality of the
Wild Horses Act was addressed by the court through the Penn Central
test. Government regulation, the majority stated, often necessitates ad-
justment of private rights for the public good. 9 7 Although regulation
often diminishes the economic use of property, it would be unreasona-
ble to compensate every affected landowner, thus requiring regulation
by purchase. Because the court found no taking had occurred, they also
dismissed the Association's claim against the Director of the BLM.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1425.
91. Id. at 1428.
92. Id. at 1428-29.
93. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
94. 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950).
95. 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99 (1917).
96. 799 F.2d at 1428-29.
97. Id. at 1429.
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B. The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Seth
In his dissent, Judge Seth emphasized that the case primarily in-
volved the BLM's failure to perform specific duties under the Act. 9 8
Judge Seth argued that the Association was entitled to compensation for
the consumption and destruction of its property from the public use.9 9
C. The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Barrett
Judge Barrett, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's charac-
terization of the Act as nothing more than a land use regulation.10 0 He
reasoned that Congress did not intend the Act to burden private parties
because of the duty it imposed on the BLM to remove the horses at the
request of the landowners. He therefore believed that a fifth amend-
ment taking violation was possible and summary disposition of the Asso-
ciation's claim was inappropriate.'
0 1
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Court's Mischaracterization of the Governmental Action
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hodel, showed a gross mis-
understanding of the Association's claim. This misunderstanding led
them to improperly apply the law by sidestepping the takings issue and
devoting three pages of discussion to the authority of the federal gov-
ernment to control wildlife. The discussion by the majority on the gov-
ernment's authority over marine animals, waterfowl, and endangered
species is irrelevant. The issues presented in Hodel have little to do with
the government's exclusive authority to control the horses. They pri-
marily involve the consequences of the Director's mismanagement or
nonaction. The Association agrees with the majority, that government
management is essential for protection of the wild horses and ecological
balance; however, it is not the authority to control that is disputed by the
Association. It is the failure of the Director to manage the wild horses
properly that violates the Act.
The majority cited Bishop v. United States102 and Sickman v. United
States 103 to illustrate that damage caused by wildlife protected under
congressional acts did not constitute a taking.H)4 In both Bishop and
Sickman, wild geese damaged crops. The property owners' claims were
denied because the importance of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which
served to protect the geese, outweighed the property owners' rights for
compensation. However, these cases cannot be applied to Hodel because
98. Id. at 1431.
99. Id. at 1434.
100. Id. at 1435.
101. Id. at 1438.
102. 126 F. Supp. 449 (1954).
103. 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950).
104. 799 F.2d at 1428-29.
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there is no clause mandating government control in the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, as there is in the Wild Horses Act.
Judge McKay, who stated in the majority opinion that the Act "is
nothing more than a land-use regulation enacted by Congress to ensure
the survival of a particular species of wildlife,"' 10 5 did not address the
real issue. As Judge Barrett stated in his dissent, the Association's claim
was not for compensation due to the promulgation of a regulation; the
case was instead about actual physical invasion of property. 10 6
The key to an analysis of the Association's claim is a proper under-
standing of the character of the governmental action. The government's
action or inaction, the Supreme Court has said, must be characterized as
either a regulatory taking or inverse condemnation. 10 7 The Supreme
Court cases which have distinguished regulatory takings from inverse
condemnation have emphasized the seriousness of the government's ac-
tion when physical use and occupation occur. 10 8 The comparison of
regulatory takings with inverse condemnation was made in Penn Central,
where the Court stated that a taking was more likely to be found when
the government action was characterized as a physical invasion than
when it was characterized as a regulatory action meeting a public pur-
pose. 109 A physical invasion is a government intrusion of unusually seri-
ous character, and the remedy is just compensation.1 10 In Loretto v.
Teleprompter, the court held that a physical intrusion by the government
was of unusually serious character.' 1 ' When the government physically
invades private property, it does not simply take a "single strand" from
the "bundle" of property rights; it chops through the bundle taking a
slice of every strand.11
2
In Hodel, the regulatory takings issue would not have been improp-
erly addressed by the court had the Association contended their damage
was the result of the enforcement of the Act. Instead, the Association
argued that nonenforcement of the Act caused the actual physical pres-
ence of the horses which resulted in the consumption of their forage and
deprived them of their right to exclude.
The Tenth Circuit accepted the government's argument that the ac-
tion was regulatory. The court erred, however, in basing its decision on
regulatory takings standards, when the actual damage was not caused by
the regulation, but by the noncompliance with the regulation. The court
should have based its analysis on the physical invasion aspect of the
claim resulting from the BLM's inaction. Loretto provided that a perma-
105. Id. at 1428.
106. Id. at 1435.
107. See supra notes 18-72 and accompanying text for comparison between regulatory
takings and inverse condemnation.
108. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); United States v. Causbv, 328
U.S. 256 (1946); Loretto v. [eleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
109. 438 U.S. at 124.
110. Sailet, Regulatorv "Takings" and Just Compensation. The Suprenme Court's Search for a
Solution Continues, 18 UuR. LAW. 635, 645 (1986).
111. 458 U.S. at 426.
112. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
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nent physical occupation authorized by the government is a taking with-
out regard to the public interest it may serve.' 13
B. Government Ownership of a Damaging Instrumentality is not a Prerequisite
for Finding a Taking when Government has Assumed Control
The facts supporting the finding of a taking in United States v.
Causby 114 are analogous to the situation at hand. In Causby, the govern-
ment owned the military aircraft which was found to have taken an ease-
ment by continually flying low over private property. In Hodel, the
government did not own the horses which grazed continually on the As-
sociation's property; however, the Secretary of Interior had assumed
complete and exclusive control over the horses. United States v. Cress 1 15
held that the government need not own the instrumentality of the inva-
sion as long as the actual use or invasion is caused by the government
action. In Cress, construction of a government flood control project
caused the private property owner's land to be repeatedly flooded by
water. Although the government did not actually own the water that
occupied the land, the United States was responsible for the invasion
and thus a compensable taking was found. 1 16 Similarly, in Hodel, the
inaction of the Secretary of the Interior resulted in the physical invasion
of the Association's property. Because the Secretary is mandated by the
Act to remove the horses upon request, the government is responsible
for the damage.
C. Takings Case Law Decided After Hodel
In its 1986-1987 term, the United States Supreme Court decided
more takings cases on the merits than in its entire history. The Supreme
Court has yet to deal with the Hodel issue of whether "nonaction," when
the government clearly has a duty to act, constitutes a taking. However,
three of the recently decided cases are relevant to the takings analysis
set forth above and deserve discussion relative to Hodel and the future of
takings case law.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 117 the California Coastal
Commission conditioned its approval of rebuilding permits for beach-
front property on the requirement that owners provide lateral access to
the public. The public easement, the commission argued, was in fur-
therance of the state interest of providing beach access to the public and
therefore was not a violation of the fifth amendment under the police
power. However, the Supreme Court focused on the Commission's jus-
tifications for the condition and found that the easement would not fur-
ther a public interest. The Agins ends-means test was not met: the
government's use of property as an easement did not further a legiti-
113. 458 U.S. at 426.
114. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
115. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
116. Id. at 328.
117. 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
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mate public interest.1 18
Along with this ends-means analysis, Justice Scalia reiterated the
per se takings rule set forth in Loretto and stated that Supreme Court
precedent has uniformly held there is a taking to the extent of the occu-
pation' Thus, a taking exists without regard to whether the action
achieves an important public benefit or causes only minimal economic
impact on the owner. 19
The Nollan ends-means analysis is not directly applicable to Hodel
because there is no issue as to whether the Act furthers a legitimate pub-
lic interest. However, application of the per se rule strengthens the As-
sociation's argument. The majority in Nollan found a permanent
physical occupation by the public's continuous right to pass back and
forth, even though no individual was permitted to station himself per-
manently upon the premises. 120 Therefore, it would seem that the same
finding of a permanent physical occupation should have been applied in
Hodel by invoking the per se rule.
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. Debenedictis, 121 mineowners
attacked the constitutionality of sections of an act prohibiting mining
that caused surface subsidence damage to pre-existing buildings. ' 2 2 Be-
cause it was a facial attack and not an as-applied challenge claiming dam-
ages resulting from application of the act to the mineowners, the inquiry
was limited to whether the mere enactment of the statute constituted a
taking. 123
Although the facts in Keystone were somewhat similar to those of
Pennsylvania Coal, 124 Pennsylvania Coal did not control the Keystone hold-
ing. Whereas Justice Holmes found the act in Pennsylvania Coal to be
solely for the benefit of private parties, the act in Keystone was found to
serve legitimate public interests, that of avoiding further subsidence
damage to surrounding surface estate owners.
12 5
The second factor on which the Court relied to distinguish Keystone
from Pennsylvania Coal is the degree of diminution of property. In Key-
stone, the court held a regulatory statute is only a taking if it denies own-
ers of all economically viable uses of of their land. 26 However, as the
Court held in Andrus v. Allard, to take one strand from the bundle of
rights is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed as an en-
118. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. The Court in Vollan believed suffi-
cient public access to the beach existed and that increased access was not in furtherance of
a legitimate public interest.
119. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.
120. Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3145.
121. 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987).
122. The Act in question is the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1406.4, 1406.6 (Purdon 1980).
123. 107 S.Ct. at 1236.
124. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
125. Keystone, 107 S.Ct. at 1246.
126. Id. at 1248 (emphasis added); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 260 (1980); Penn Cen-
tral Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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tirety. 12 7 Thus, the Court in Keystone denied the mineowners' facial chal-
lenge of the act because they did not prove it was impracticable for the
miners to continue mining all types of coal.'
2 8
The final relevant case decided by the Court during this term, Hodel
v.. Irving,12 9 involved an amendment of the Indian Land Consolidation
Act of 1983 which threatened to deprive Indian landowners of the right
to pass property to their heirs. Property would only be subject to the
amendment, section 217, if it was small, undivided, and if its productiv-
ity was low during the year preceding the owner's death. Upon the
death of the owner, this small parcel would escheat to the tribe to ame-
liorate the problem of extreme fractionalization of the land. Justice
O'Conner, after making an ad hoc inquiry as to the impact of the regula-
tion, its interference with investment-backed expectations, and the char-
acter of the governmental action, found the new amendment to be a
taking. 13 0 The impact of the regulation was determined to be substan-
tial even though the income from the land was de minimis. Justice
O'Conner stated that, although the value of the land may not be much,
the right to convey land to heirs is itself a valuable right. 13 1 The stick in
the bundle of rights involved here, the right to pass property to heirs,
could be equated to the right of a property owner to occupy land free
from physical invasion, as in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel. '
3 2
Denial of either stick invokes the per se rule, resulting in the finding of a
taking.
Through these recently decided cases, the Court has reaffirmed the
framework for examining whether a regulation amounts to a taking. By
examining the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action, the Court makes an ad hoc factual inquiry and de-
termines which test should be used. If the character of the governmental
action is a permanent physical invasion, as in Nollan, the inquiry is lim-
ited, and the per se rule is applied. The holdings in these recent
Supreme Court cases, which are consistent with established precedent,
are contrary to the finding of Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel.
V. CONCLUSION
The character of the government's action must be identified by the
courts in a takings analysis in order to determine what precedent to fol-
low. The nature of the government's interference with private property
owners' rights should be distinguished as either a regulation or a physi-
cal occupation. Differentiation by the courts is essential because the
Supreme Court has developed different standards in their takings analy-
127. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
128. Ken'stone, 107 S.Ct. at 1250.
129. 107 S.Ct. 2076 (1987).
130. Id. at 2084.
131. Id. at 2082.
132. 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986).
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sis, depending on the character of the action. Although the Court has
given deferential treatment to the legislature to regulate as they see fit,
because of the serious character of a governmental action which physi-
cally uses and occupies private property, government physical invasion
has been closely scrutinized. Permanent physical occupation of private
property by the government is a taking without regard to the public pur-
pose it may serve, and thus deserves compensation under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
In Hodel, there is no doubt that the wild horses, as a result of the
BLM's noncompliance with the Wild Horses Act, physically invaded the
Association's property. Therefore, the regulatory takings analysis set
forth by the Tenth Circuit was inappropriate. Enforcement of the Wild
Horses Act did not cause the damage to the Association's property and,
furthermore, compliance with the Wild Horses Act would have pre-
vented the damage. The wild horses are controlled exclusively and af-
firmatively-by the BLM under the Act. Had the BLM complied with the
Act, the damage caused by the wild horses would never have occurred.
The majority, in their analysis of Hodel, whether inadvertently or
intentionally, misconstrued the basis for the cause of action in uphold-
ing the government's authority to regulate. As a result, the court's anal-
ysis did not address the issues around which Hodel centers.
Sarah S. Godfrey
[Vol. 65:4
